in American jurisdictions. 2 While much has been written concerning the right of criminal defendants regarding access to grand jury materials, 3 this comment will examine the growing trend among the federal courts to allow exposure of grand jury proceedings for purposes other than the prosecution or defense of the main criminal action. examined. Constitutionally and statutorily based criticism of the manner in which some litigants gain access to grand jury materials will be evaluated. In addition, this comment will place considerable erphasis on the degree to which the reasons behind the grand jury secrecy rule are satisfied by the application of the current standards for disclosure requests. The purposes for grand jury secrecy in American jurisdictions were set out in United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp. :6 1) to prevent the escape of suspects before indictment can be accomplished; 2) to protect the freedom of grand jury deliberations; 3) to prevent tampering with grand jury witnesses before their testimony is given at public trial; 4) to encourage unrestrained disclosures by grand jury witnesses, with no fear of retaliation; and 5) to protect a suspect found innocent by the grand jury.
7 Federal courts since the Amazon of a grand jury over the subject matter under investigation. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) . Testimony can be compelled through the grant of use immunity, despite a claim of fifth amendment privilege. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) . One may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence taken in violation of fourth amendment rights. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) . There is no right to counsel in the grand jury room. Gallaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 960 (1969) . Furthermore, a grand jury indictment may not be challenged at trial although based on hearsay, Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) , or on evidence taken in violation of an accused's right against self-incrimination. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 349 (1958) . In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) , the Court stated:
The grand jury may compel production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. 6 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931) . For the purposes of this paper, only the fourth reason-the encouragement of unrestricted testimony by grand jury witnesses-is of much import since disclosure of grand jury materials to civil litigants is generally requested following the completion of the main criminal litigation. The first, second and fifth bases of grand jury secrecy are no longer applicable once an indictment has been returned, the accused is in custody, and the grand jury is dismissed. The third basis is not relevant once the criminal trial has ended. The fourth basis, however, is considered applicable to a subsequent civil proceeding. The Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth reason to decision have recognized, more or less, these same bases of the grand jury secrecy rule. 8 In general the case law concerning whether grand jury material may be disclosed to litigants and, indeed, the reasons for secrecy themselves show a primary concern with the continued viability of the grand jury itself as an investigative body free from extraneous pressures. 9 Pressures to which a grand jury may be exposed include not only the fear of retaliation in grand juror and grand jury witness alike, but also unnecessary control by any person or group over the direction a grand jury investigation may take. In order for the grand jury to function independently, it should ideally be free from the proddings of the judiciary, the executive, the numerous civil agencies and public opinion.
The rule of grand jury secrecy forbids only the disclosure of grand jury "materials." "Materials" include not only the transcript of proceedings, but also information concerning theidentity of persons called to testify 10 and documents subpoenaed. In addition, "materials" subject to the secrecy rule may consist of sentencing memoranda prepared by the Government 2 Pa. 1972) . This exception to the rule of grand jury secrecy is applicable where a discovering party identifies documents that happened to be before the grand jury at some point in time, in contrast to a general request for all documents examined by the grand jury. The rationale for this exception is that the documents are being sought "for their own intrinsic value" rather than to learn "what transpired before the grand jury." 405 F. Supp. at 931.
15 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) provides in part: (e) Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure. Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with ajudicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. " The federal courts have tempered the terms of the statute by limiting, in some situations covered by the statute, the circumstances in which disclosure may be granted, see text accompanying note 17 infra, and by permitting disclosure in some circumstances not contemplated by the statute. See In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973) .
17 356 U.S. 677 (1958) . Procter & Gamble, the defendant in a civil antitrust suit, argued that since the Government had free access to the grand jury transcript, the defendant should, too. The company established that although the power of a trial judge to order disclosure of grand jury material is discretionary, the discretion may be exercised only where the party seeking disclosure can show "particularized need." ' In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v 2 The facts found sufficient in Dennis for disclosure of grand jury testimony of certain prosecution witnesses were: 1) the trial testimony of the witnesses would postdate their grand jury testimony by 15 years; 2) the witnesses were key to the case; 3) their testimony was largely uncorroborated; 4) the witnesses were not impartial observers and, thus, their testimony was suspect. On the other hand, it was observed that none of the reasons behind the policy of grand jury secrecy, as articulated in the Amazon case, was applicable. Id. at 872-73, n. 18.
24 See cases cited note 1, supra.
in which the articulated need of the litigant for materials is balanced against the reasons for grand jury secrecy still applicable in the particular case.
ACCESS TO GRAND JURY MATERIALS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Rule 6(e) provides that disclosure can be made to "attorneys for the government" without an order from the district court. The cases are now consistent in holding that "attorneys for the government" includes only federal officials.2 These federal officials may have access to grand jury material in subsequent civil actions also, 26 with some restrictions. The major restriction is that the Government cannot use the grand jury process in order to make out a civil caseY. Mo. 1966) , the court restricted the use of grand jury testimony by the Government while deposing its own and the defendant's witnesses by ordering the Government to 1) announce that it would use the prior testimony, and 2) show the witness a copy of it, allowing him time to read it before deposing him.
13 See Petition of Brooke, 229 F. Supp. 377 (D. Mass. 1964) , where the Attorney General of Massachusetts sought disclosure of grand jury minutes for use in both an on-going civil suit by the Commonwealth, and to obtain criminal indictments; Application of California, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961) , where California, private utilities and municipalities bringing a civil antitrust action were denied disclosure of grand jury subpoenaes upon a showing of mere economic and time savings.
3 Smith v. United States, 423 U.S. 1303 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1975) . The petitioner argued that obtaining the grand jury material would save the state investigatory expenses and would be useful in refreshing witnesses' memories when they testified before the state grand jury. Justice Douglas found it "doubtful" that particularized need was made out. Id. at 1304. Another factor indicating need-that the statute of limitations would soon run out on the offense suspected-was rejected as under the prosecutor's control. However, upon consideration of the Amazon reasons for grand jury secrecy, it would appear that disclosing materials to a state prosecutor conducting a subsequent criminal inquiry does not harm the integrity of the grand jury as an institution. All but the fourth reason, the encouragement of free disclosure, are inapplicable to the situation. Grand jury witnesses expect, if anything, that the evidence they give will be used by a prosecutor to build a criminal case; there should be little intimidation from the knowledge that the prosecutor works at a state level. More importantly, it is improbable that a state prosecutor could control the direction of a federal grand jury investigation for his own purposes; independence of the grand jury is not threatened by the disclosure.
state attorney general could obtain disclosure of federal grand jury minutes upon a showing that an offense had been committed under Illinois laws, that showing satisfying the particularized need requirement; In re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence, 184 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960) , where the state prosecutor was found to have established particularized need where he anticipated the use of grand jury materials to save him time and effort, to determine which persons to call as witnesses before the state grand jury and to serve general discovery purposes. Two restrictions were placed upon the prosecutor. He was to wait for termination of the federal proceeding before obtaining the material. "Protection of the witnesses-a constituent of the rule of grand jury secrecy-dictates this course." Id. at 41. The prosecutor was also to limit the use of grand jury materials to development of leads; he was not to use the materials as evidence at trial.
36 "[A]fter the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940) .
37 See United States v. General Electric Co., 209 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962) .
38 On the other hand, private civil litigants, e.g. in the antitrust field, may have a significant part in enforcing federal statutes. Yet the particularized need standard is applied to them. See text accompanying notes 67-69, supra.
ACCESS TO GRAND JURY MATERIALS BY AD-MINISTRATIVE BODIES
Administrative agencies generally seek access to grand jury materials in one of two ways: the agency may request disclosure in connection with its own proceedings, or it may seek disclosure as an investigatory aide of the United States Attorney, i.e., in connection with the criminal proceedings. A federal agency does not come within the first sentence of Rule 6(e); 3 9 therefore, it must show particularized need in order to gain disclosure. This is true even though the agency is joined with the Government as co-plaintiff 40 or the agency is represented by an attorney in the Justice Department. A common objection to a request by an administrative body for use of grand jury materials in its own right has been that the disclosure is not "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding" per Rule 6(e Permitting an administrative agency access to grand jury material while the grand jury is still conducting its investigation creates a number of potential problems among them being erosion of congressional limitation on agency powers, the possible chilling effect on potential witnesses and undue agency influence on the course of grand jury inquiry. The court denied that the U.S. Attorney himself could use grand jury materials to prepare a civil case while the grand jury was still investigating. 42 See In re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence, 184 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960) , where a city was denied disclosure of grand jury evidence to be used in an administrative hearing; United States v. Crolich, 101 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Ala. 1952), where the Government moved for disclosure to the county election board. Hand defined 'judicial proceeding" liberally, so that many administrative hearings might fit within the second sentence of Rule 6(e).41 Practically any administrative hearing is preliminary to a judicial proceeding in the sense that a court might be called upon to review some aspect of the hearing. Therefore, the objection has not succeeded in preventing administrative bodies from gaining access to grand jury materials .44
A second method by which administrative access to grand jury materials is gained is through providing technical assistance to the Government in preparing a grand jury case. The assistance of professional administrative personnel may be necessary in preparing highly complex cases, e.g., tax evasion cases. 45 However, the subsequent use of knowledge gleaned from grand jury materials in a civil administrative hearing smacks of abuse of the grand jury processes.
11
[W]e hold that, prima facie, the term "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding determinable by a court, having its object the compliance of any person, subject to judicial control, with standards imposed upon his conduct in the public interest, even though such compliance is enforced without the procedure applicable to the punishment of crime. Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958) . A United States Attorney had obtained an order directing him to disclose grand jury minutes to the Grievance Committee of the New York City Bar Association. The court found the disclosure to be preliminary to a proceeding before the New York Appellate Division to discipline a member of the bar. 41 Disclosure has been granted to participants in a proceeding for revocation of a beer permit upon an "ends of justice" criterion, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Even though investigative agents are assigned by the various agencies to assist the government's attorneys, they are never assigned in a capacity which separates them operationally from their agencies. No matter what agency they work for, they are required to submit reports to their agencies and are subject to supervision within each particular agency. Apparently, this is a constant practice throughout the federal law enforcement system. Id. at 475.
It is clear that a grand jury investigation cannot be instituted solely for the purpose of making an inquiry into civil matters. 46 Access by administrative personnel has been denied where the investigation had an admittedly dual civil and criminal interest." However, it may be difficult to uncover the basic purpose of a grand jury inquiry. Some courts have examined the history of administrative interest in the person(s) under scrutiny by the grand jury to determine if abuse of the system was indicated. 48 Upon a granting of a motion to disclose grand jury materials to administrative agency personnel, the court order usually contains a requirement that the material remain under the "aegis" of the Government. 49 But "aegis" is a murky concept.
5 0 Some measure of control over the grand jury materials is to be retained by the prosecution, but the amount of control is unclear. For example, that the grand jury material has been moved physically to the offices of an agency does not, in itself, indicate lack of control by the Government."i As long as agency access to grand jury materials is gained through a bona fide prosecution, and the materials remain under the "aegis" of the prosecution, a majority of courts sees no barrier to subsequent use of that information in an administrative civil suit. " discussed several objections to allowing agency access to grand jury material through this "back door" method. First, the primary and only work of the grand jury is to accuse individuals "the mere fact that the government contemplates possible use of the subpoenaed material in a possible future civil proceeding is no grounds for a protective order." Id. at 472.
Employment of grand jury evidence in a concurrent civil administrative trial has been approved by at least one court. In re Kadish, 377 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. I11. 1974). The taxpayer moved to quash a grand jury subpoena for his records on the theory that the evidence gained would be used to establish civil liability.
It is well established that a grand jury may not be utilized solely for the purpose of making an investigation of civil matters.... However, this does not preclude the government from using this evidence, legitimately developed by the grand jury, in concurrent or future civil proceedings. Tax Cas. 86,195, 86,197 (9th Cir. 1976 suggested that the Justice Department, when bringing I.R.S. aides into the investigation, require an oath of secrecy concerning the grand jury materials' contents, prepare comprehensive written instructions on the use of the material, and ensure that grand jury material be kept separate from other I.R.S. papers.
In addition, the Justice Department was ordered to keep a record of 1) a general description of the investigation; 2) the persons being investigated; 3) the administrative personnel having access to the material; 4) the supervisory personnel of the agency involved in the investigation; 5) the supervisory personnel of the Justice Department involved, and 6) dates on which the material was received, consulted, and use terminated by the agency.
62 "These devices should help insure that the records will not be utilized by the agency in any independent sense; concomitantly, they underscore and infuse meaning into the "aegis" concept." Id. at 1128. 86,195 (9th Cir. 1976 ). The I.R.S. had been investigating Simplot for several years prior to the grand jury inquiry. Simplot appealed the granting of a 6(e) order to disclose grand jury material to I.R.S. personnel. tive access to grand jury materials will be ordered, 64 and that a district court granting access would retain "close supervision" over the information in an attempt to prevent civil use of the materials. 65 The court also indicated that the remedy for civil use of information obtained through aiding a grand jury investigation would be suppression of that evidence at the civil trial. 6' Two requirements, however, are so basic to the preservation of values served by grand jury secrecy that they should be explicitly stated: (1) on appropriate request, the agency must identify the source of its information in a civil case that was preceded by a grand jury investigation in which its personnel were used to assist the prosecutor in presenting a case to the grand jury; and (2) upon a motion to suppress in the civil proceeding, the agency bears the burden of proving an independent source for the informa- were the unique nature of the nation-wide deposition program involved, 7 and the fact that some plaintiffs were agencies charged with protecting the public's interest. In addition disclosure was to be minimal. Grand jury secrecy was to be safeguarded by the use of in camera inspection for inconsistencies in grand jury testimony of each individual deponent.
[1977] TAX CAS. (CCH)
A trend toward freer use of grand jury testimony in deposition taking is appearing. It has been held not to be necessary to show inconsistency between the two testimonies in order to establish particularized cause. Where a fair amount of time has elapsed between the two statements, 79 where the deponent's memory proves dim, 80 or where deponents are not subject to service of process,"" a court might find particularized cause for producing grand jury transcripts. The practice of examining in camera grand jury transcripts before releasing for deposition purposes has fallen into disfavor; 82 the Supreme Court has indicated' that it is the function of the advocate, not the trial judge, to determine the usefulness of evidence to a side's cause. Despite a unanimity of opinion in early case law that disclosure of grand jury material for purely discovery purposes should never be permitted, s4 it is often permitted today upon a showing of proper circumstances, reflecting a federal policy in favor of liberal discovery.
5
Disclosure for discovery purposes is allowed where the reasons behind the rule of grand jury secrecy are no longer applicable to any significant degree and/or where the party seeking disclosure will be at a disadvantage if grand jury material is not provided to him.
A group of cases granting disclosure of grand jury materials for purely discovery purposes has turned upon the fact that the party opposing the request had knowledge of the grand jury proceedings.
6 Courts perceive this situation as an inequitable one that should be reme- Corp., 194 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1958) . In Schwabe the plaintiffs counsel had worked with the prosecution in the previous criminal trial. He, therefore, had knowledge of the contents of the grand jury testimony.
87 See, e.g., U.S. Industries, Inc. v. United States District Court, 345 F.2d at 23, where discovery of a government sentencing memorandum containing grand jury material was granted:
The facts in the present case lend additional support to a liberal discovery ruling, for here the document in question is of government origin and the party opposing disclosure has had an opportunity to inspect its contents. It therefore seems highly inequitable and averse to the principles of federal discovery to allow one party access to a government document and not the other. It is particularly inequitable when the
1977]
been granted to civil plaintiffs where the defendant had access to the grand jury transcript during his criminal trial, 88 where the defendant had examined a sentencing memorandum containing grand jury information at the sentencing stage of his criminal trial, 9 and where the defendant debriefed grand jury witnesses in preparation for trial." A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to any exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution, 91 which could be contained in grand jury transcripts. Absent a showing of compelling reasons for nondisclosure, a criminal defendant also has the right to examine any sentencing report prepared by the prosecution. 92 To condition a defendant's exercise policy reason for denying the other party access to the document is essentially inapplicable to the given situation. ' In re Cement-Concrete Block, 381 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1974 , where, although use of the grand jury transcript was limited to refreshing recollection, impeachment and testing credibility of trial witnesses, no particularized need was required to be shown. Connecticut v. General Motors Corp., [1974] TRAnE CAS. (CCH) 97,079 (N.D. Ill. 1974) , where the court reasoned that since the only grand jury transcript had been physically delivered to the defendants, Rule 6(e) was not applicable at all to the plaintiffs request for discovery.
The fact that the United States, as a civil plaintiff, has free access to grand jury materials, on the other hand, is not a sufficient basis for granting disclosure to the defendant. Before imposing sentence the court shall upon of either of these rights upon the surrender of a claim of confidentiality of grand jury proceedings in a subsequent civil trial seems unfair, if not unconstitutional. 93 In Hancock Bros., Inc. v. Jones, 9 4 the court recognized a constitutionally-based objection, and in denying disclosure of a pre-sentencing memorandum to civil plaintiffs remarked that to allow disclosure would be unconstitutional. The same argument, however, was made without success in Connecticut v. General Motors Corp. 9 5 The court found that no right to secrecy of grand jury proceedings had ever rested in the defendants. Therefore, the exercise of any constitutional rights the defendants may have had at their criminal trial was not conditioned upon a release of any other right . 96 The analysis of the General Motors request permit the defendant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the presentence investigation exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence.... Where the right is "fundamental," a state must show a compelling interest to justify conditioning legislation. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) .
0 ' 293 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1968 . If disclosure to the defendant is used as a basis for disclosure to the third party litigants in a civil proceeding, the criminal defendant's access to information via Rules 32(c) and 6(e) of the Fed. R. Crim. P. is seriously hampered. The defendant is thereby compelled to choose between exercising a recognized privilege or maintaining the confidential nature of such information. This result is undesirable as well as unconstitutional in instances where the Constitution requires giving the defendant access to such information. Id. at 1234. 
1974).
96 The suggestion in the brief of Ford and General Motors that the disgorging by them of Grand Jury transcripts is somehow a deprivation of or encroachment upon the constitutional rights of these two corporations, is to assume a right to the continued secrecy of the testimony of certain individuals before the Grand Jury which no longer exists, and which never in any court would appear to be correct, upon examination of the traditional reasons for the policy of grand jury secrecy. 97 It is clear that the policy exists only for the benefit of the unindicted, as opposed to the indicted accused.
9s
The constitutional objection to granting access to grand jury materials in order to "even up" the knowledge of the two litigants, however, is resolved if courts would permit free disclosure of grand jury minutes to all private litigants. This seems to be the direction courts are taking, 9 9 although Procter & Gamble has not been overruled. First, the major premise behind denying disclosure of grand jury testimony in subsequent litigation, that disclosure may deter future grand jury witnesses from testifying freely, is tenuous. The Supreme Court has argued that should grand jury testimony be released on less than a showing of particularized need "testimony would be parsi- App. 115, 364 A.2d 1119 App. 115, 364 A.2d (1976 , where the court stated that the rule of secrecy exists for three groups of people: the grand jury itself, witnesses before it, and unindicated suspects.
99 While the Supreme Court has not yet authorized automatic disclosure in treble damage actions, the scope of discovery is normally wider in civil litigation than in criminal prosecutions. Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37, 41 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1969 ) (emphasis added).
100 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959) .
1'But what are the limits of this temporary secrecy? The answer is, on principle, that it ceases when the grand jury has finished its duties and has either indicted or discharged the persons accused:
(1) If the grand jury indicts D on W's testimony, it is plain that secrecy is no longer of any avail, for W will be summoned as a witness at the trial and will be compellable to testify. If he tells the truth and the truth is the same as he testified ation where the witness is the defendant's employee and may be coerced into "volunteering" information to his employer anyhow. 102 In the rare case in which retaliation is feared, the grand jury transcript may be released with names of witnesses deleted, 0 3 or with the provbefore the grand jury, the disclosure of the former testimony cannot possibly bring to him any harm (in the shape of corporal injury or personal ill will) which his testimony on the open trial does not equally tend to produce. If on the other hand his testimony now is inconsistent with that before the grand jury, the privilege ought not to apply. The need for the evidence in the criminal prosecution of D exceeds any injury that would inure to the witness-grand jury relation.
(2) If, on the contrary, the grand jury, after hearing W's testimony, nevertheless discharges D, there may now be a motive for W to desire secrecy, as when on a subsequent trial it is desired to impeach W as a witness by showing his biased utterances against D before the grand jury. But here the privilege ought also to cease for another reason, namely, that the chance that such a disclosure will be called for is too small a contingency to have any effect a priori in rendering W unwilling to make complaint or give testimony before the grand jury; W naturally will have expected that D would be indicted. Moreover, when W is summoned on a civil trial involving the same matters as the criminal charge and it is desired to impeach him by his former testimony, all motive for secrecy ends for the same reasons noted in paragraph (1) supra. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2362 (McNaughton rev. 1961) .
102 Grand jury witnesses may reveal their testimony to whomever they please. Arlington Glass Co., Inc. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 24 F.R.D. 50 (N.D. Ill. 1959 
PUBLIC
In a rare circumstance, a grand jury witness may request that his own testimony be made public. That request has been granted where disclosure was in the public interest.1 07 Generally, however, release of grand jury materials to the public is effected through a grand jury report or presentment. The power of a grand jury to make a presentment is recognized in the Constitution.
0 " Strictly speaking, a grand jury "presentment" is an accusation of crime, comparable to an unsigned indictment, while a "report" makes no such accusation. 0 9 While a federal grand jury clearly Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973) . Mr. Biaggi, a Congressman, sought disclosure of his testimony after newspapers reported that he had exercised his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination 30 times. Although there was no judicial proceeding with which the disclosure could be connected, the court released the testimony under the theory that all those possibly benefiting from the rule of secrecy-the witness and the Government- has the power to make a presentment or report, the district court must decide what degree of disclosure, if any, will be made of it." 1 A fairly recent opinion concluded that "the court should regulate the amount of disclosure, to be sure that it is no greater than required by the public 'interest in knowing' when weighed against the rights of the persons mentioned in the presentment.""'
There is a discernible trend in the federal courts toward permitting disclosure of grand jury reports. Where the grand jury had desired to present an indictment, but the United States Attorney has refused to sign it, disclosure of a presentment would seem to be in order.1 2 Substantial publicity concerning the nature of a grand jury report has resulted in release of this report."' On the other hand federal grand jury reports may be expunged if they deal with matters outside the grand jury's concern, i.e., the enforcement of federal statutes." 4 A report commenting upon the sufficiency of evidence against an indicted defendant also must be expunged, as violative of his right to a fair trial before an unprejudiced body of peers." concerned citizens. Where a grand jury report recommended subMitting material to an appropriate governmental body, and the disclosure was in the public interest, it was permitted. 118 However, where a report drew conclusions and appeared to direct a governmental agency to take certain action, the court refused to issue it, citing a separation of powers problem.liS Upon examining the grand jury report in light of the traditional reasons for secrecy, it is apparent that disclosure should be tightly regulated. There remains a great deal of debate concerning the fairness of the grand jury presentment or report. Although proponents argue that the public has a right to know about conduct falling just within the bounds of legality, 1 20 detractors view reports as possibly unfounded accusations of misconduct in which the accused is provided no forum of reply. The report recommended that the NLRB revoke certification of some unions whose representatives had invoked the fifth amendment while testifying before the grand jury. The court saw a clear violation of the separation of powers principle, classifying the grand jury as an arm of the judiciary. Contra, United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 178-79 (5th Cir. 1965 ) (Rives, J., dissenting). However, the opinion can also be perceived as a reaction to an attempt by a grand jury to deprive the petitioners of their constitutional right against self-incrimination.
120 Thus grand jury presentments of public affairs serve a need that is not met by any other procedure. The grand jury provides a readily available group of representative citizens of the county empowered, as occasion may demand, to voice the conscience of the community. There are many official acts and omissions that fall short of criminal misconduct and yet are not in the public interest. It is very much to the public advantage that such conduct be revealed in an effective, official way. No community desires to live a hairbreadth above the criminal level, which might well be the case if there were no official organ of public protest. Such presentments are a great deterrent to official wrongdoing. By exposing wrongdoing, moreover, such presentments inspire public confidence in the capacity of the body politic to purge itself of untoward conditions. In re Presentment by Camden Grand Jury, 10 NJ. 23, 66, 89 A.2d 416, 443-44 (1952 A grand jury report concerning an innocent person may cause that person unnecessary embarassment. In addition, grand jury witnesses may be reluctant to testify freely if it becomes a common practice to expose the witness' testimony to public scrutiny. These objections, however, may be overcome where the grand jury investigation has received such publicity that only disclosure of the true nature of the proceedings can combat rumors. If the publicity is accurate, disclosure can do no more harm than has already occurred. If the publicity is inaccurate, disclosure of the true nature of a grand jury report could protect innocent persons.
CONCLUSION
The rule of secrecy of grand jury proceedings has at its roots a concern that the grand jury system be permitted to function as an independent institution empowered to investigate crimes. In order to function thus, grand jurors must be free to act on their own, independent of control by court, prosecutor or any civil agency. Grand jury witnesses must be free to testify without fear of reprisal. Ii determining motions for disclosure of grand jury materials under Rule 6(e), courts should emphasize the reasons behind the rule. The standard of "particularized need" should not be routinely applied to every request for disclosure. The perceived dangers of revealing grand jury materials vary from case to case. In particular, there is great variation among the four types of parties seeking access: state prosecutor, administrative agency, civil litigant or the public; each category presents its own threats to the grand jury system. The grand jury report cases are a commendable example of the value of a case by case analysis, unhampered by a "particularized need" requirement. The trial judge balances the public's "right to know" against any perceivable harm to a grand jury suspect or witness. The rule of grand jury secrecy in this way truly relates to its purposes. On the other hand, the cases determining access of official, administrative and private civil litigants to grand jury materials often show a preoccupation with the particularized need standard with little consideration of the real benefits or dangers of the disclosure requested.
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